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Responding to
Corporate Takeovers:
Raiders, Management,
and Boards of Directors
by Murray Weidenbaum
As news about hostile takeovers hits the
headlines and not just the business pages,
names like Boone Pickens, Carl Icahn and
Ivan Boesky have become far better known
than the CEOs of General Electric, General
Motors, General Foods, General Mills or any
other general. Takeovers have also developed
a colorful vocabulary of their own-"poison
pills," "shark repellents," "junk bonds,"
"raiders;' "white knights," "wolf packs," and
"greenmail:' Beyond the glamour there is a
genuine public policy debate about takeovers
that deserves examination and evaluation.
This report looks at the arguments put forth
by the "raiders" and "entrenched management" and then discusses the potential but
vital role of a third force in corporate
takeovers.

Introduction
Many members of Congress have become
concerned over what is viewed as a rising
trend of hostile mergers. "I think it is time
for Congress to send a clear signal to corporate America that we will no longer tolerate
unrestrained warfare between top managements for control of corporate assets:' That
stirring indictment of competition in the
market for corporate control was stated by
Murray Weidenbaum is Mallinckrodt Distinguished University Professor and Director of the Center for the
Study of American Business at Washington University in
St. Louis. He serves on several corporate boards of
directors.

Representative Peter Rodino, chairman of
the House Judiciary Committee.
In that spirit, in the last session of Congress, more than 50 bills were introduced to
deal with mergers and acquisitions. Over
twenty hearings on the subject were held by
nine different committees. However, no single piece of legislation came close to passing.

If the raiders are opportunists,
it is boards of directors and
senior executives who have given them
the opportunity.

tee for Economic Development, in its influential report on the social responsibility of
business, states that the professional manager regards himself as a "trustee" balancing
the interests of many diverse participants
and constituents in the enterprise. It is interesting to note that shareholders are only
listed as one among those worthy groupsand they are listed last.

The Case for Government Intervention

Opinions vary sharply on many aspects of
corporate takeovers, and especially those initiated by shareholders who oppose existing
managements. Many economists and other
scholars contend that this process keeps
executives on their toes and thus enhances
shareholder value. The executives of these
same firms, in striking contrast, assert that
hostile attempts to change corporate control
reduce business productivity and performance. They argue that unfriendly tender
offers divert management attention and corporate resources from the serious business
of producing and distributing goods and
services.
Yet, on reflection, if the raiders are opportunists, it is boards of directors and senior
executives who have given them the opportunity. Too many CEOs and boards have
focused on the ballet and the opera as the
epitome of a corporation's responsibility to
society. They seem to forget that a business
is an economic institution, designed to provide goods and services for consumers in
order to benefit the shareholders.
The irony is that some of the problems of
the takeover "targets" have arisen from their
desire to be more socially responsible. The
modern business literature tells management to balance the desires of employees,
customers, suppliers, public interest groups,
and shareholders. For example, the Commit-

Three key arguments are offered by those
who believe that corporate takeovers are
harmful and should be regulated more fully
by the federal government:
#1. Hostile takeovers are socially and economically detrimental. Hostile takeovers are
viewed as leading to forced liquidations or
restructuring of viable companies by "raiders" who reap considerable profit. The process is supposed to leave the companies in
weakened and highly leveraged positions.
The groups initiating hostile takeovers are
considered to be mere financiers and speculators who are not serious about the operations of the companies, and who are in it
solely for quick profits.
In this view, takeover threats force managers to look to the short term in order to
keep their current stock price high. This
diverts attention from longer-term investment potential and growth. Alfred Chandler,
Jr., the distinguished business historian of
the Harvard Business School, worries about
the rising trend of unfriendly takeovers:
"How can anyone justify it? It provides no
productivity, services, or function .... While
our managers are fighting takeovers, the Japanese are finding it easier to take over their
markets."
As investment banker Felix Rohatyn put it,
"large corporations can be treated like artichokes and simply torn apart without any
regard for employees, communities, or customers, solely in order to pay off speculative
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debt:' Peter Drucker has echoed this theme:
The new wave of hostile takeovers has
already profoundly altered the contours and
landmarks of the American economy. It has
become a dominant force ... in the behavior
and actions of American managements and,
almost certainly, a major factor in the erosion
of American competitive and technological
leadership.

The standard response of economists is
that the stock market's valuation of takeover
efforts is very positive. Numerous studies
show that the stock of the target goes up
quickly on the mere announcement of a tender offer, and that of the buyer usually
moves little at all.
The common argument offered by economists who assume that markets are "efficient" is that mergers, even hostile ones,
provide economic gains in the form of economies of scale, better management and more
productive allocation of resources. The very
threat of a takeover is supposed to discipline
inefficient management. Redeploying assets
in restructured companies may cause some
unemployment and community dislocations,
but the assets do not disappear from the
economy. The new investors have a strong
economic incentive to put them to productive
use. Thus, hostile takeovers are seen as creating real value for both bidders' and target
companies' shareholders.
Management's rejoinder to the economists
is that short-term increases in share prices
are not the appropriate basis for evaluating
the costs and benefits of takeovers. Nor do
all economic analyses of stock data support
the standard view that stockholders of the
target necessarily benefit from takeovers. A
study at the University of Maryland of 78
mergers and takeovers in the period 1976-81
concluded that three years later the price of
the acquirers' stock was much lower than if
it had continued performing as it had before
the acquisition.
Takeover opponents also argue that a gain
in the share value of the merged company
4

does not necessarily prove that expected efficiency increases are responsible. The key factor may be a reduction in taxes, which
reflects neither improved efficiency in the
use of resources nor benefits to the economy.
It is intriguing to examine what actually
happens to target firms subsequent to acquisition. In the case of the 25 major acquisitions of 1965, only 13 were still part of the
acquirers or their successors by early 1986.
Ten others were divested, one was dissolved,
and still another is up for sale. To be sure,
this is a small sample from which to draw
conclusions, but there seems to be little historical evidence that tenderers have managed the businesses they acquired any more
profitably than their industry peers. Nor
does there appear to be much evidence that
they have achieved significant profitability
improvements for the firms taken over.
To sum up the controversy about takeovers,
the shareholders of the target firm usually
benefit but those of the raiders rarely do.
The takeover effort must therefore reflect a
lack of concern by the raiders with the interests of their shareholders.
What then motivates them? There must be
large "rents" (extraordinary gains) available
from control and management of large enterprises. In order to obtain such special gains,
the raiders are willing to offer above-market
prices for the shares of the target company.
The academic supporters of takeovers look
down at existing management of target firms
because of their supposed lack of concern
for their shareholders. To be consistent, it is
equally hard to deify the managements of the
"sharks," who have little more regard for
their own shareholders.
#2. Credit markets are negatively affected
QY "non-Rroductive" merger activity. Speaking for the Federal Reserve System, Board
Chairman Paul Volcker says, "I ... have concerns about the potential risks associated
with mergers and takeovers when these
transactions involve unusual amounts of
leveraging." After acknowledging that many
5

Investment bankers note two current practices that may be considered to be "abuses:·
One is the ability to commence a takeover
without having binding financial commitments in place. Such conditional bids have a
headline-grabbing effect and stampede the
shares of the company into the hands of arbitrageurs and speculators. The second abuse
involves the tactic of putting a company into
"play:• Seemingly deliberate leaks drive the
shares of the company into the hands of
short-term speculators.
The proponents of takeover efforts note
that many other abuses arise from the
efforts of managements to repel unsolicited
overtures. They contend that shareholder
value is reduced when companies adopt "poison pills" and other "shark repellents:·

mergers may have positive social effects,
Volcker warns that "these potential benefits
clearly are diminished if the mergers are
accompanied by more fragile balance sheets
or more precarious loan portfolios."
Other critics view takeovers as draining
resources from longer-term investment and
growth-enhancing activities. In the event of
default on "junk" bonds, many financial
institutions may be adversely affected.
Takeover activity is also criticized because of
large "transaction costs" benefiting lawyers,
investment bankers, accountants, and printing and advertising firms.
The responses to these arguments take
many forms. The concern over transaction
costs is put into perspective; their large absolute size (in millions of dollars) is dwarfed by
the billions of dollars involved in the financing process. To the critics of junk bonds, the
rejoinder is that the risk-reward ratio of
these securities is in line with the economics
of the market and basic principles of financial analysis. One risks more in order to earn
more. Moreover, the credit is not "used up"
but recycled in the economy.
In any event, new bonds issued in exchange
for stock in target companies came to less
than 1 percent of new debt in non-financial
corporations in 1980-83. Credit to finance
the equity purchases in the largest takeovers
in 1984 amounted to only 1 to 1.5 percent of
domestic debt. Moreover, two-thirds of the
bank loans extended to finance those mergers were repaid by April 1985, the bulk
within six months.
#3. Abuses have crept into the takeover
process. One prominent attorney describes
the situation as follows: "We have entered
the era of the two-tier, front-end-loaded,
bootstrap, bust-up, junk-bond takeover." In
this view, the free flow of information has
been impeded and the relative economic
power of bidders and management has been
altered. The use of high-yield, low-rated
"junk" bonds to finance acquisition is one
such example.

Proposed responses to the problems generated by hostile takeovers range from laissezfaire to tough new legislation designed to
"correct" the perceived market failures.
Here are the five key alternative approaches:
1. No problem exists, therefore, no "solution" is necessary. The prevailing academic
view is that the market for corporate control
is functioning reasonably well. Given the passive roles of many boards of directors, hostile takeovers are helpful in keeping
companies on their toes and in replacing
inefficient, en trenched managements. If
there is any role for public policy, it is to prevent management from thwarting the will of
the shareholders.
2. There is a problem with regard to hostile takeovers, but it will cure itself. Those in
this second category believe that the hostile
takeover phenomenon will cool substantially
when the next serious recession reduces the
earnings of the highly leveraged companies.
Many corporations being restructured to a
riskier mode as a result of leveraged buy-
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Alternate Public Policy Approaches

outs may go "belly up." These negative experiences will dampen the ardor of other
potential hostile suitors and reduce the funding available to them.
In this second view, the takeover wave will
subside as a result of natural causes and
hence no change in public policy is warranted.
3. There is a continuing problem, but it can
be handled with further changes in tax policy. Because the tax deductibility of interest
is a key element of most hostile takeovers,
this group contends that changes need only
be made in tax provisions favoring debt over
equity.
Interest charges are tax deductible while
dividends are taxed twice, once at the corporate level and again at the level of the individual shareholder. Even though the current tax
reform legislation will remove capital gains
advantages for equity financing, the reduction in corporate and individual tax rates
will reduce tax differentials for debt versus
equity overall.
4. The federal government should resort to
additional regulatory devices. One possibility is to tighten the criteria for allowable
investments for life insurance companies
and pension funds. Some favor the SEC
investigating trading "abuses," such as
manipulation of stock prices via false
rumors, leaks, and other sharp arbitrageur
practices.
5. The takeover problem is so serious that
tough new legislation is required. The aim is
to make it more difficult for shareholder
groups to make tender offers that are not
endorsed by the company's board of directors.
Most of the bills introduced in Congress to
regulate corporate acquisitions are designed
to protect target companies. For example,
one bill would give outside directors of a target company the right to veto a tender offer
or the acquisition of a controlling interest,
subject to reversal by a vote of the shareholders. Another bill would prohibit open market
8

purchases by one corporation of more than
20 percent of another's stock. Yet another
legislative proposal would deny successful
acquirers a tax deduction for interest on
debt incurred to finance their acquisition.
Moving across the spectrum of government
intervention in corporate governance is no
simple matter. Each of the more activist
approaches is likely to generate serious and
often unexpected side effects-the "government failure" that so frequently accompanies attempts to deal with "market failure."

Conclusions

Contests for control of some large companies have focused national attention on hostile
takeovers. Yet these transactions represent
only a small fraction of the changes in control of American corporations carried out
each year. Most takeovers continue to be
friendly and approved by the boards of both
companies involved. In many cases, the
board of the target firm may have required a
bit of coaxing-such as the threat to "walk
away" and see the price of the target company's stock drop sharply.
Considerable evidence shows that takeover
contests are beneficial for stockholders of
target companies. In this regard, it is intriguing to note the views of top executives of the
most successful firms toward their stockholders. In one recent study, two faculty
members of the Harvard Business School
report that none of the top executives of the
12 successful American companies they studied was concerned about the current market
value of the company's stock. One CEO
stated this position very clearly:
The highest priority with me is perpetuation
of the enterprise. I'd like to leave this joint in
better shape than when someone passed me the
baton. I have to take care of the shareholders in
this, but I don't sweat the shareholders too
much. Most investors in our industry are
passive.
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The two researchers concluded that the
successful managers were committed "first
and foremost, to the enhancement of corporate wealth, which includes not only the
firm's financial assets reflected on the balance sheet but also its important human
assets and its competitive positions in the
various markets in which it operates."
Do corporate takeovers promote economic
efficiency? The great bulk of the academic
literature states that the answer is yes. Why
else, the reasoning goes, would share prices
rise on the mere announcement of a hostile
takeover effort?
The cold, hard reality is that there is little
organized data to affirm or discredit the efficiency hypothesis. It is difficult, however, to
reconcile that hypothesis with the large number of "post-merger divorces" -up to 40 percent of the acquisitions of the 1970s.
One comprehensive study shows that tenderers have not managed the businesses they
acquired any more profitably than their
industry peers. Nor have they achieved significant profitability improvements relative
to the pre-takeover situation. In addition, the
Congressional Tax Committee says a large
portion of the stock price gain is due to capitalizing the tax benefits.
Yet there is no need-or justification-to
argue that all takeover attempts are benign
or that every effort to repulse them is laudable. Some businesses benefit from new
management or even the threat of a change
in management. Some "shark repellents"
benefit small stockholders by providing barriers to two-tiered tender offers. Reasonable
amounts of self-interest can be expected on
the part of both those attempting corporate
takeovers and those opposing them.
The most significant factor to take into
account in evaluating proposals for government to "do something" about hostile
takeovers is historical. The long and intricate
experiences of government involvement in
business decision-making are not impressive.
Study after study shows that government

The balance between management's need
to act expeditiously in the interest of the corporation and the shareholder's right to call
that action into account should be resolved
at the level closest to the problem and the
relevant facts-by the corporation, its owners, and managers in the first instance; by
state law, if necessary; and by federal law
only as a last resort. This does not mean that
inequities in the battle between management
and tenderers created by tax biases or existing regulations should not be addressed. But
the basic task of insuring that the market for
corporate control serves investors, employees and other interested parties ultimately
lies outside of government.
The heart of a positive response to unsolicited takeovers is not poison pills or shark
repellents nor is it government restraints on
raiders. There is a third and often neglected
force designed to foster stockholder interests, the company's own board of directors.
Under law, all corporate power is exercised by or under the authority of the board.
Directors must really act as fiduciaries of
the shareholders. But the complacent or
rubber-stamp director has not totally vanished from the boardroom. Responding more
fully to the desires of the owners of the business is the key to repelling takeover threats.
Corporate officials, both board members and
officers, often forget until the company's
stock is in play that shareholders continually
vote with their dollars.
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often does more harm than good when it
interferes in private economic matters. The
presence of some shortcoming in the private
sector (often called "market failure") is not
sufficient cause for government to intervene.
Much government regulation fails to meet an
elementary benefit-cost test.

The heart of a positive response to
unsolicited takeovers rests with
the company's own board of directors.

The most important, and rarely performed, duty of the board is to learn how to
say no. It is up to the board to veto proposed
capital investments whose yield is below the
cost of capital-even if some key executive is
going to get upset because it was his or her
pet project.
The outside directors especially must
learn to act on the knowledge that the inside
directors who serve on the board with them
are occasionally motivated by different concerns. Acquisitions may be good for executives whose compensation is related to the
size of the company, but some can be poor
investments for shareholders. A supergenerous corporate donation to the ballet may do
wonders for the social life of the CEO, but it
hardly benefits the shareholders.
The challenge to many boards is to pay out
more cash for shareholders and to reduce
outlays for low-yield projects. The record is
clear: If the board will not make the difficult
choices that enhance the value of the corporation, the takeover artists will. Takeover
mania is not a cause but a symptom of the
unmet challenge.
Outside directors are the heart of the critical third force in contests for corporate control. They need to bear in mind that the
future of the corporation is in their handsas long as they serve the desires of the shareholders.
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